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Abstract 
 
 
In December 1997 the IMF offered Korea loans to help alleviate its financial crisis. These 
loans were accompanied by what the IMF called “extreme structural conditionality.” 
Korea was required to replace its traditional East Asian economic system with a 
neoliberal model. We review economic performance in the neoliberal era. Growth has 
slowed, poverty and inequality have risen, and investment spending has stagnated, while 
foreign ownership of Korean firms and banks has skyrocketed. We argue that foreign 
investment has not helped Korea. For example, by leading a shift from corporate to 
consumer lending, foreign control of Korea’s financial markets has constrained capital 
accumulation and helped create an excessively indebted household sector, while making 
it harder for the government to adopt progressive economic policies. We conclude that 
the eight year experiment with radical neoliberal restructuring has turned out well for 
foreign capital and wealthy Koreans, but has been a failure for the majority of Korea’s 
people. 
 
JEL codes. O19; F34; F36 
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I. Introduction 
 
Prior to late 1997, Korea’s state-guided East Asian economic model was widely 
admired by Western economists, the IMF and the World Bank for its exceptional long-
term development record. For example, Stanley Fischer, later to become chief economist 
for the IMF, wrote in 1996 that “there really has been a miracle in East Asia” and that the 
view that government action was central to this success is “widely shared” (1996, pp. 345 
and 347).  
In the decade preceding 1997, under external pressure from G7 governments, 
foreign firms and banks who wanted to share in the Korean ‘miracle,’ and internal 
pressure from the large family-owned conglomerates known as chaebol and wealthy 
individuals who wanted freedom from government restraint, the structures of Korea’s 
state-guided economy were dismantled. The state ended its traditional control of chaebol 
investment decisions, substantially reduced its regulation of domestic financial markets, 
and loosened control of cross-border money flows, with short-term capital flows most 
aggressively deregulated. Chang and Evans argue that “the dismantling of the 
development state was effectively finished by … 1995” (2005, p. 115). Foreign short-
term credit, which stood at $12 billion in 1993, rose to $32 billion in 1994, $47 billion in 
1995, and $67 billion in 1996. These funds helped create an over-heated, investment-led 
boom and created serious financial fragility in the economy.  In 1997, after the outbreak 
of the Asian financial crisis, foreign banks refused to renew short-term loans, demanding 
payment.  Illiquid Korean banks and highly leveraged firms were unable to comply.  
With key banks and nonfinancial corporations on the verge of default, the Korean 
government accepted an IMF loan to help repay their foreign debt.  In return, the IMF 
took effective control of the Korean economy. 
The post-crisis conventional wisdom asserts that the structure of Korea’s 
economy prior to the crisis was fatally flawed. Mainstream economists acknowledge that 
the liberalization of short-term capital flows created the dramatic rise in short-term 
foreign debt that triggered the crisis. However, they insist that liberalization was not the 
fundamental cause of the crisis; it merely exposed the underlying rot within. (See MOFE 
1999, Greenspan 1999, Brittain 1997, Hahm and Mishkin 2000, Borensztein and Lee 
1999, and Krueger and Yoo 2001.)  
There is an alternative interpretation of recent events in Korea, whose adherents 
include numerous heterodox scholars (Chang 1998, Singh 1999, Wade and Veneroso 
1998, Crotty and Dymski 2001, Crotty and Lee 2001) along with a few prestigious 
mainstream economists such as Joseph Stiglitz, former Chief Economist for the World 
Bank, and Harvard’s Dani Rodrik. They argue that the major cause of the crisis was not 
inherent inefficiencies in the structure of the Korean development model, but rather 
contingent inefficiencies primarily created by a liberalization process that disastrously 
weakened the structural integrity and coherence of the traditional Korean economic 
system.1 In this view, the problem in the 1990s was not too much state intervention, but 
the elimination of government functions essential to efficiency within the Korean model. 
(This thesis is defended theoretically and empirically in Crotty and Lee 2004.) In 
particular, absent the deregulation of short-term capital inflows in the 1990s, there would 
                                                 
1 We do not deny that the Korean ‘model’ had developed serious problems prior to the crisis and was 
therefore in need of substantial reform. 
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have been no system-shaking financial crisis, no IMF takeover, and no radical neoliberal 
restructuring. 
The IMF acknowledged in statements made both just before the crisis and several 
years after it that Korea faced a liquidity crisis in late 1997, not a systemic failure. The 
October 1997 IMF report on Korea, called attention to the “absence of deeper solvency 
concerns.” At that time, the IMF’s worst-case scenario for Korea in light of the Asian 
crisis was a modest drop in the growth rate to 4.5% in 1998 (IMF 2003, pp. 162-63). Yet 
in December 1997, just two month later, the IMF declared that the Korean economy was 
in a state of profound structural dysfunction, requiring radical emergency surgery. This 
was the reason it imposed what it called “extreme structural conditionality” on Korea, 
along with tight monetary and fiscal policy to restore foreign investor confidence (IMF 
2003, p. 179). The IMF’s post-crisis evaluation report of 2003 says that if the IMF and 
World Bank had announced that they would provide Korea with as much foreign 
exchange as it needed, there would not have been a financial crisis at all.  
The IMF’s long-term objective was the destruction of the traditional Korean 
model. In its explanation of its response to the Asian crisis offered in January 1999, the 
IMF emphasized that “forceful, far-reaching structural reforms are at the heart of all 
[our] programs, marking an evolution in emphasis from many of the programs that the 
IMF has supported in the past” (emphasis in original). The structural reforms included the 
need to “break the close links between government and business” that define the East 
Asian model, “ensure the integration of the national economy with international financial 
markets,” increase the “potential for foreign participation in domestic financial systems,” 
and “remove impediments to growth such as monopolies [i.e., the chaebol system], and 
trade barriers…” (IMF 1999). We are especially concerned here with IMF demands for 
full integration with international financial markets and open access for foreign financial 
firms. The IMF acknowledged the existence of strong outside pressure on the policies it 
imposed on Korea. “The IMF’s major shareholder governments made no secret of their 
view that IMF assistance should be accompanied by strong reforms. The U.S. authorities 
in particular insisted that strong reforms should be a condition of IMF support” (IMF 
2003, p. 185).  
The IMF had an enthusiastic partner in President-elect Kim Dae Jung.  In a 1985 
book titled Mass-Participatory Economy: a Democratic Alternative for Korea, he stated 
that “maximum reliance on the market is the operating principle of my program” and that 
“world integration is our historic mission” (1985, pp. 78 and 34).  “I believe that the 
crisis will be remembered as a blessing,” Kim announced in 1999, “because it is forcing 
essential economic changes” (New York Times, Feb. 18, 1999).   
The goals of the IMF-Kim team were as follows. First, to create a fully ‘flexible’ 
labor market. President-elect Kim was determined to erode the domestic market power of 
large chaebol firms and raise their efficiency through massive foreign investment, which 
would not take place unless Korea’s militant unions were tamed.  Breaking the labor 
movement thus became a central policy goal. For the first time in modern Korean history, 
firms were allowed to fire as many workers as they pleased in cases declared to be of 
“urgent managerial need” (which included foreign takeovers), and temporary help 
agencies were legalized. Second, to end government interference with the free-market 
allocation of finance through conversion from a state-guided, bank-based to a globally-
open capital-market based financial system. The government’s objectives here were to 
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drastically reduce credit flows to the chaebol groups and induce foreign banks to take 
control of much of Korea’s banking system in order to improve its allocative efficiency. 
The stock market was to replace owning families as the controlling power of chaebol 
firms. Third, to move toward “world integration” and help break the power of chaebol by 
fully opening all Korea’s markets to foreign firms. “What we need now, more than 
anything else, are foreign investors,” Kim stated in an address to the U.S. Congress in 
1998.  These goals were accepted by current President Roh, much to the regret of the 
trade unions and progressive activists who made his election possible.  
In the next section, we briefly review economic performance in post-crisis Korea 
and discuss the impact of capital market opening on Korea’s economy. Section III 
analyses the results of financial market liberalization and foreign ownership of Korean 
banks, while the last section draws conclusions and discusses policy options. 
 
II. Neoliberal restructuring: slow growth, high inequality, and the rising influence 
of foreign capital 
 
Post-crisis Economic Performance 
  
Though many Korean firms had become very financially fragile, the IMF raised 
the short term interest rate from 13% in early December 1997 to 34% just one month 
later, holding it above 20% through mid 1998. It imposed restrictive fiscal policy as well. 
Real GDP growth fell by 6.9% and domestic demand by 13.8% in 1998. Thus, the cause 
of the near-depression conditions of 1998 and early 1999 was the perverse policy 
response to the Korean crisis put in place by the IMF-Kim team.  
As can be seen in Table 1, the economy rebounded in 1999 and 2000 due to a 
radical shift in macro policy, a record trade surplus, a sharp rebound in consumer 
spending and a huge injection of public funds into the financial sector. It experienced a 
mild recession in 2001 as investment slumped and the trade surplus declined. Rapid 
growth returned in 2002 as consumer spending rose by an impressive 7.6% and 
investment increased. The economy slumped again in 2003 as consumption spending 
actually fell – its growth rate declined by 7.9 percentage points from a year earlier, and 
capital formation slowed. The 3.1% GDP growth rate in 2003 was the lowest in the past 
two decades, 1998 excepted. Strong growth in net exports raised economic growth 
modestly in 2004 even in the face of stagnant consumption and investment spending. 
Most projections for GDP growth in 2005 are below 4%. Post-crisis performance is thus 
far inferior to pre-crisis achievements: the average rate of GDP growth from 1998-2004, 
at 4.2%, is much lower than the 8% averaged in the entire pre-crisis regime and the 7.1% 
in 1993-97.  
 
Table 1. Economic performance after the crisis in Korea (%, $ billion) 
 
  1993-
1997 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Real GDP growth 7.1 4.7 -6.9 9.5 8.5 3.8 7.0 3.1 4.6 
Consumption growth 6.5 3.2 -10.6 9.7 7.1 4.9 7.6 -0.3 0.2 
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Fixed investment 
growth 
12.3 -2.3 -22.9 8.3 12.2 -0.2 6.6 4.0 1.9 
Net export/GDP -1.1 -0.6 12.9 6.7 3.2 2.3 1.4 2.4 4.4 
Government 
deficit/GDP 
-0.0 -1.4 -3.9 -2.5 1.1 1.2 3.3 1.1 0.7 
Household debt/GDP 40.5* 46.6 41.3 44.3 51.1 62.0 73.6 --**  
Foreign reserves ($ 
billion)  
21.7 8.9 48.5 74.1 96.2 102.8 121.4 155.4 199.1 
Debt ratio in 
manufacturing 
319.5 396.3 303.0 214.7 210.6 182.2 135.4 123.4 104.2 
Ordinary profit/Sales 
in manufacturing 
1.7 -0.3 -1.8 1.7 1.3 0.4 4.7 4.7 7.8 
Source: BOK, National Accounts, based on 2000 prices 
* Household debt is average from 1994 to 1997 
** Due to the change of GDP statistics, direct calculation is impossible. 
 
In 1999 the government decided to strengthen domestic demand and reduce 
Korea’s excessive dependence on export growth. The only way to achieve this admirable 
goal on a long-term basis would be to increase jobs and real wages, while stimulating 
domestic investment. The government chose instead to deregulate consumer lending and 
provide tax incentives for consumer credit. This policy was a short-term success; the 
average growth in consumer spending was a spectacular 7.4% from 1999-2002. A 
residential real estate boom took place at the same time that added to household 
indebtedness. This government policy left a crushing household debt problem in its wake.  
Household debt as a share of GDP rose spectacularly -- from 41% in 1998 to 74% in 
2002. This share is now as high as in the low-saving US, but the situation is more 
precarious because the ratio of financial assets to debts is only about half the US value. 
An outbreak of defaults that devastated the credit card industry combined with an end to 
government borrowing incentives brought consumption spending to a stop in 2003 and 
2004. On average, consumption, which grew at annual rate of 6.5% in 1993-97, inched 
ahead at 2.3% a year from 1997-2004.  
Most important, post-crisis investment spending stagnated. Gross investment 
ranged from 35% to 40% of GDP from 1990-97, but has been between 25% to 31% since 
then. A BOK survey shows that private sector equipment investment, a key foundation 
for productivity growth and the future competitiveness of Korean firms, which collapsed 
in the crisis of 1998 and rebounded in 1999 and 2000, has failed to grow since then (BOK 
2004). Equipment investment was lower in 2004 than in 1996. Investment problems are 
most serious in small and medium companies.2 Investment stagnation poses a serious 
threat to future prosperity. 
Investment has been constrained by several forces. Domestic demand growth has 
slowed significantly while volatility and uncertainty have risen. Profits were low through 
                                                 
2 According to a survey by the Korea Industrial Bank, large firms’ equipment investment started to increase 
in 2004 while that of small and medium firms shrank by 34%. These companies have lower profitability 
than most giant firms and cannot get adequate bank funding. 
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2001, hindering investment. Starting in 2002, corporate profitability improved due to a 
fall in interest payments (as debt declined and interest rates fell) as well as a drop in 
labor’s share of income, but investment did not respond.3 In the new Korean economy, 
profits are increasingly used to raise dividends, buy back shares, and create a cash 
stockpile, rather than finance investment. Foreign-controlled banks have led a strategic 
shift in banking away from corporate to consumer lending, drying up a major source of 
investment finance. An increase in outward FDI that began in the mid-1990s also 
contributed to the investment malaise. While inward FDI was about $13 billion in 2004, 
outward FDI hit $8 billion, almost half of which went to China. 63% of outward FDI was 
by manufacturing firms, raising fear of a ‘hollowing out’ of Korean manufacturing 
(Korea Herald, “Korea’s overseas investment jumped in 2004,” January 26, 2005). In the 
first half of 2005, outward FDI exceeded inward FDI. 
Thus, the only buoyant demand category in the past two years was net exports. 
How ironic! Government policy tried to shift demand from exports to domestic spending, 
yet domestic demand is sluggish while export dependence grows. Export plus imports as 
a percent of GDP rose from 65% in 1997 to 84% in 2004 -- when the ratio of net exports 
to GDP hit 4.4%. However, the export boom is itself unsustainable: the won has 
appreciated recently, imported energy prices are rising, firms continue to rely on 
imported intermediate goods, and export growth increasingly depends on a super-heated 
Chinese economy. Moreover, such heavy export dependence is irrational because the 
terms of trade have collapsed since the crisis. 
Neoliberalism exacerbated the fragmentation of Korea’s economy and society. 
The gap between large chaebol firms in the export sector and small and medium firms in 
the domestic sector has been increasing; many of the former are doing well while the 
latter suffer. The link between the export and domestic sectors appears to be weakening; 
fast growing export oriented ICT industries such as semiconductors and mobile phones 
rely heavily on imported intermediate goods. Thus, export growth does not trigger as 
much domestic spending as before (Lee et. al. 2004). 
Social fragmentation also increased. The share of workers with ‘irregular’ jobs, 
including workers with temporary contracts and part-time jobs, is, at 56%, the highest in 
the OECD. Wages and working conditions for irregular workers are much worse than for 
those with permanent jobs. “Nonregular workers are paid lower wages [about half], are 
entitled to fewer benefits and are not well covered by the safety net… less than 8% of 
nonregular workers are covered by unemployment insurance, medical insurance or the 
national pension”(IMF 2004, p. 36). Labor’s share of income fell significantly, from 
62.3% in 1997 to 58.8% in 2004. Since the share of employed persons categorized as 
‘workers’ increased from 61.7% in 1998 to 66% in 2004, the erosion of labor’s economic 
share is serious. Meanwhile, the percent of workers who belong to unions is declining 
steadily. 
Indices of inequality increased substantially in the aftermath of the crisis and 
remained high since then. The Gini coefficient for urban workers’ families is about 10% 
higher now than in 1997, while the ratio of the income of the top 20% of working 
                                                 
3 Operating profits/sales have been lower than in the pre-crisis era, which suggests that allocative efficiency 
has not improved. (Operating profits are measured before the deduction of interest payments and certain 
other expenses.) However, a dramatic reduction in financial expenses/sales substantially raised ordinary 
profits/sales after 2001.  
 
 7
families to the bottom 20% rose from 4.5 in 1997 to 5.9 in the first quarter of 2005 – a 
record high for Korea.4 The rise in the ratio of the top to the bottom 10% rose by a third. 
Government policy does little to ameliorate rising inequality. In contrast to developed 
countries, Gini coefficients calculated with and without the inclusion of government 
transfers and taxes are not significantly different. The poverty rate more than doubled 
since the crisis, but the welfare system, while improved, remains inadequate to deal with 
the social problems created by neoliberal policies. Social welfare spending is just 10% of 
total government spending. Unemployment compensation is technically available to more 
workers in the new Korea, but in 2003 only 19% of the unemployed actually received 
benefits (IMF 2004, p. 39).  Even the research institute of the conservative Bank of Korea 
recently published a report calling for efforts to establish a virtuous cycle between the 
export and domestic sectors and reduce income inequality (Lee et al. 2004).  
 
Economic opening and capital inflows 
 
Capital account liberalization was the proximate cause of the crisis, yet in 
response, the Kim government, under pressure from the IMF and the G8, dramatically 
accelerated the pace of financial opening. In May 1998 the government abolished limits 
on the percent of corporate stock that foreigners could own. Regulations on foreign 
investment in most corporate bonds, in the forward market and in commercial paper were 
eased or abolished. The government permitted hostile M&As by foreign investors after 
1997 and made a concerted effort to sell important financial institutions to foreign buyers 
(MOFE 1999, pp. 137-151). Restrictions on foreign borrowing by domestic firms were 
further liberalized in 1998. In April 1999 the government permitted nonresidents to hold 
long-term deposits in domestic financial institutions, further deregulated firms’ short-
term foreign borrowing, accelerated deregulation of real estate investment abroad, and 
permitted all Korean financial institutions and individuals to engage in foreign currency 
transactions. In 2001 regulations on individuals’ purchases of foreign currency and 
spending abroad were repealed, and domestic deposits by foreign financial institutions 
and the purchase of foreign bonds by Koreans were deregulated (Korea Economic Daily, 
April 23, 2000; MOFE 2000). Regulations on nonresidents’ bond issuance and borrowing 
in domestic currency were repealed in 2002, as were foreign exchange transactions of 
financial institutions, including derivatives trading. By 2006, remaining restrictions on 
foreign capital transactions will be lifted (MOFE 2002).  
Capital flows increased rapidly in response. As can be seen in Table 2, though net 
portfolio inflows have been modest, both inflows and outflows have grown rapidly, and 
are now very large (both exceeded $100 billion in 2004) and extremely unstable. In 2004 
portfolio inflows were almost nine times as large as in 1998. Large and volatile short-
term capital flows have created substantial instability in stock prices and the exchange 
rate. Korean stock prices now respond primarily to changes in US investor sentiment: the 
correlation between US and Korean stock prices is high (BOK, 1999). The Korean stock 
market has become a gambling casino for foreigners. In just three weeks in May of 2004 
“massive withdrawals of investment funds by foreign investors” caused the KOSPI stock 
market index to fall by 22% (Korea Herald, “Foreign funds outflow from bourse easing” 
                                                 
4 This survey covers workers’ families living in cities. For all families in cities, the top 20%/bottom 20% 
ratio is 8.2.   
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June 10, 2004). 
 
Table 2. Foreign capital flows in Korea after the crisis ($ billion)  
 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
FDI inflows 3.2 6.9 8.8 15.5 15.2 11.3 9.1 6.5 12.8 
Portfolio           
  Inflows 12.6 13.2 16.5 41.7 60.1 43.9 65.4 81.6 116.2 
  Outflows 8.0 12.1 11.7 36.2 48.8 36.4 66.2 68.1 106.8 
  Net inflows 4.6 1.1 4.8 5.5 11.3 7.5 -0.8 13.5 9.4 
Total (portfolio 
inflows + outflows) 
20.6 25.3 28.2 78.0 108.9 80.4 131.6 149.6 222.9 
 
Source: Bank of Korea and Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy.  
 
In recent years the Bank of Korea has been forced to ‘sterilize’ the inflow of 
foreign funds (created by capital inflows and huge trade surpluses) by issuing ‘Monetary 
Stability Bonds’ (MSB) to ensure that the trade surplus is not destroyed by a rapidly 
appreciating won. The BOK sold large quantities of won in exchange for foreign 
currencies, creating a $200 billion pool of foreign reserves in the process, and 
simultaneously issued won denominated bonds to limit the supply of won in public 
hands. The supply of MSB increased from 23.4 trillion won in 1997 to 105.5 trillion in 
2003 and 142.8 trillion won in 2004. The increasing interest burden associated with this 
aggressive sterilization policy recently pushed the BOK into deficit for the first time in a 
decade. The ever-rising foreign reserve hoard comforts those who remember Korea’s 
vulnerability in the 1997-98 crisis, but excessive exchange reserves are a costly form of 
protection, and they could not prevent financial instability in the event of another bout of 
exceptionally rapid capital outflows. It would be far more effective to reinstitute effective 
controls over short-term capital flows (a thesis defended in Rodrik 1999). 
Korea’s capital market opening also led to a surge of inward FDI.  President Kim 
forced Korea’s highly indebted chaebol conglomerates to put key assets on the market 
after 1997 by demanding that they cut their debt-to-equity ratios in half -- in just two 
year. Thus, only foreign firms could afford to bid for the assets they disgorged. (See 
Crotty and Lee 2001 for a detailed description of this process.) Moreover, capital flight in 
late 1997 and early 1998 caused the value of the won to collapse – from 844 won per 
dollar in 1996 to 1415 in at the end of 1997. Korean assets were thus offered to foreign 
capital in a fire sale not open to domestic bidders. Encouraged by deregulation, fallen 
asset prices and a collapse in the value of the won, cumulative FDI inflows from 1998-
2000 were two-thirds larger then total inward FDI from 1962 to 1997. Korea got little in 
return. The lion’s share of asset sales were in the form of M&As. New capital assets were 
not created, existing assets merely changed ownership.5 There is no convincing evidence 
                                                 
5 Foreign takeovers were “Purchase and Assumption” deals in which foreign investors bought only the 
good assets of the firms while bad assets and debts were shifted onto newly created public institutions. 
When this was accomplished, foreign owners established a new firm and bought its stock. Thus, M&A-type 
FDI is greater than the total acquisition of outstanding stock. In 2000, the share of greenfield investment 
was reported to be less than 10% of total FDI (Hankook Kyoungje Shinmun. Apr. 12. 2000). According to a 
UN report, M&As were the dominant form FDI in East Asia since the crisis, a finding confirmed by Mody 
and Negeshi (2001). 
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that FDI inflows were helpful to the recovery process in Korea or in East Asia (Mody and 
Negishi 2001).  
   
Is foreign capital helping Korea’s economy? 
 
Foreign stock ownership, especially of important chaebol firms, increased 
dramatically post-crisis. The share of foreign ownership of Korea’s publicly held stock 
increased from 15% in 1997 to 22% in 1999, 37% in 2001 and 43% in early 2004. 
Foreigners have gained strong influence in important industries such as semiconductors, 
autos, petrochemicals, and finance. The foreign ownership share of the ten firms with the 
largest market capitalization has risen to an astounding 54% (Korea Herald, “Foreign 
investors flock to Korean stock market,” January 19, 2005). Control of most chaebol 
conglomerates by their domestic owners has been sustained in the face of rising foreign 
ownership through interlocking ownership among chaebol firms and controlling-family 
ownership of unlisted shares.6  However, foreigner owners have recently tried to control 
the investment policy and corporate governance structures of the firms they hold stock in. 
A foreign equity fund tried on several occasions to take control of the SK group, the third 
largest chaebol in Korea. Even Samsung, Korea’s largest and most profitable company, 
appears vulnerable to a foreign takeover. The corporations precariously controlled by 
domestic insiders have begun to incorporate fear of foreign takeover into their strategic 
decision making. This reinforced the investment constraining behavior mentioned above. 
These firms hold more cash, pay more dividends (dividend payments to foreigners rose 
from $ 0.4 billion in 1998 to $ 3.1 billion in 2003), and make more stock buybacks than 
they did previously. “This trend has spurred the largest shareholders of Korea’s listed 
companies to increase ownership in their companies to defend managerial control against 
what they perceive as increasing takeover threats, raising concerns about already sagging 
corporate investment” (Korea Herald, “Foreign investors increase stakes to gain more 
input,” June 21, 2005).  
It is not clear that the transfer of advanced technology by foreign firms sought by 
President Kim has taken place. Foreign ICT companies repatriated 98% of profit in 2002 
with almost no domestic investment or R&D spending (Seoul Kyoungje Sinmun, 
November 23, 2003). Worse yet, Korea’s top chaebol firms never did require a 
technology transfer from abroad to remain competitive in their domestic and global 
markets, as the success of Samsung, Hyundai, POSCO and LG demonstrate. 
Curiously, as the costs of foreign portfolio and FDI inflows and outflows become 
clearer and the benefits less certain, the government has increased its efforts to attract 
foreign capital. Given Korea’s experience with foreign capital since the crisis, this 
continued hunt for yet more FDI is astonishing, and demonstrates the utter futility of 
economic policy-making since 1997.7  
                                                 
6 Listed firms account for about 61% of the 30 top chaebols’ capital. Insiders, such as owner-families and 
affiliate firms, controlled 65% of unlisted firms and 32% of listed firms in 2001, suggesting an insiders’ 
total share of 45% in 2001. In 2004, the total insiders’ share of the top 15 private chaebol (excluding public 
firms) was 46.4%.  
7 The fact that total investment was a higher share of GDP than domestic saving provided a superficial 
defense of the need for foreign investment before the crisis. However, saving has exceeded investment in 
the post-crisis years; in 2004 gross saving exceeded domestic investment by 4.6% of GDP.  
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The most troubling problems created by rising foreign ownership have taken 
place in the financial sector. They are analyzed in the next section.  
 
III. Financial Liberalization and the Effects of Foreign Bank Ownership 
 
Global shareholder capitalism 
 
 The neoliberal model that has guided Korean restructuring envisions a world in 
which efficient capital markets decide how much is invested in each country and what the 
allocation of finance across competing uses will be. Those who own financial capital are 
free to send it to whatever country offers the best expected returns. Supporters of 
neoliberalism argued that financial capital would flow from the capital rich advanced 
countries to the capital poor but opportunity rich developing world, accelerating poor 
country growth. To benefit fully from the new system, it was argued, Korea would have 
to open its financial markets to foreign firms. World-class foreign banks would bring 
state of the art technology and managerial systems to Korea’s dysfunctional financial 
system. This is global shareholder capitalism, a system in which efficient stock and bond 
markets are supposed to shift financial capital from poorly run firms to those most 
efficiently managed. A vigorous market for corporate control is essential to its operation: 
stock markets must punish inefficient companies by slashing their market value, making 
them attractive takeover targets for more capable domestic or foreign management teams.  
We believe this guiding vision is fatally flawed; adopting its policies is a recipe 
for instability, economic stagnation, and rising inequality. No country that trusted lightly 
regulated financial markets to make its saving and investment decisions has ever had a 
successful development experience (Chang 2002, Amsden 2001). To take one example of 
its shortcomings, in recent years capital has moved from developing countries, especially 
in Asia, to the US – not the other way around. America currently receives about three 
quarters of all the capital that crosses national borders. Most of the money that does go to 
developing nations is concentrated in a few countries, with the state-guided Chinese 
economy getting the lion’s share. Because capital flows have become so volatile in the 
neoliberal era, many countries have been hit by devastating currency and banking crises.8 
In response to such crises, countries in Asia have built absurdly large stocks of dollar 
reserves to protect against runs on their currencies. It has been estimated that the cost of 
holding excessive reserves in East Asia is between one and two percent of GDP (Baker 
and Walentin 2001).  
As noted, managements are under increasing pressure to keep stock prices high 
even in the shortest of runs to avoid hostile foreign takeover. Managers also seek rising 
short-term stock prices in order to maximize the value of management stock options, a 
form of compensation that dominates the top echelons of US companies and has begun to 
penetrate Korea. Samsung executives made almost one trillion won in capital gains on 
                                                 
8Advanced countries are not immune to these dangers. In the early 1990s, several Scandinavian countries 
experienced financial crises following financial liberalization. In the late 1990s, rising US stock prices, 
inflated by massive accounting fraud in such companies as Enron and World Com made possible by 
excessive deregulation, led to over-investment in ICT industries. An ICT spending collapse ensued, leaving 
three-quarters of a million workers idle.  
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their stock options last year (Korea Herald, “Samsung execs stock-option gains put at 
W1 tril,” September 24, 2004). Using stock price as the main index of managerial 
competence might be reasonable if stock prices reflected long-term enterprise 
‘fundamentals’ – as in efficient markets theory. But as Keynes stressed decades ago, 
lightly regulated financial markets are prone to bubbles and herd behavior. The stock 
turnover ratio in Korea is among the world’s highest. In 1999 the ‘average’ Korean stock 
was sold about 3.5 times, convincing evidence that stock prices cannot possibly reflect 
long-term “fundamentals” (The Economist, June. 24, 2000, p. 122) It would be irrational 
for the average investor -- who will own a stock for less than four months -- to be 
concerned with long-term prospects. Moreover, pressure to use the firm’s internal funds 
to raise dividends and buy-back stock reduces the internally generated funds available to 
finance investment spending, as it has done in the US (Crotty 2002). Shareholder 
capitalism thus imposes a short-term planning horizon on managements that, in concert 
with increased uncertainty and decreased internal and external sources of finance, 
constrains and distorts long-term investment.9 
No country is in practice willing to put its economic future completely in the 
hands of domestic and foreign stock and bond speculators -- no matter how deep its 
ideological commitment to neoliberalism. Rapid stock price declines, which in neoliberal 
theory are rational signals to cut investment, have triggered government efforts to push 
prices up again. In late 2004, for example, the government announced a “plan to mobilize 
public funds, including the national pension fund, to prop up the stock market (Korea 
Herald, “Plan to mobilize pension funds faces criticism,” November 20, 2004.) Such 
policies clearly indicate that the government believes it is a better judge of the optimal 
rate of capital investment than financial markets – an implicit rejection of shareholder 
capitalism.   
 
The foreign takeover of Korea’s banking system 
 
Opening Korea’s financial markets was a central component of the strategy to 
move rapidly from a highly regulated and “repressed” financial system to a lightly 
regulated and globally open one. President Kim and the IMF believed that domestic 
banks were too backward to lead the financial revolution. Designed for a radically 
different purpose, domestic banks had neither the managerial skills, the experience, the 
technology, the organizational structure, the strategic orientation nor the access to capital 
required to replicate sophisticated financial markets in North America and Europe. As 
President Kim put it: “Under the strategy of government-led economic development, the 
government used the financial industry as a tool to implement its industrial policies… 
Consequently, Korean financial institutions have been significantly less sound and 
profitable than their foreign counterparts” (MOFE 1999, p. 87.) Foreign institutions were 
thought to be required to change the structure and efficiency of Korea’s financial markets 
quickly. Domestic banks would be forced to compete with them -- on their terms -- or 
fade into oblivion. Since the government had effectively nationalized many Korean 
financial institutions in the process of absorbing their bad debts -- at an enormous cost of 
                                                 
9 The Wall Street Journal explains the problem in the US as follows. “Even companies enjoying strong 
profits and cash flow are building cash hoards, reducing debt and buying back their own shares – instead of 
making investment bets” (“Global Economy Depends on Investment,” July 21, 2005). 
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some $140 billion, it was in position to sell these firms to whoever it wanted. Kim wanted 
foreign buyers.  There was a subsidiary advantage: foreign firms had no commitment to 
existing stakeholders, whereas domestic firms had implicit contracts with their workers as 
well as with the domestic firms that were their long-standing customers. Thus, outsiders 
could be counted on to immediately slash both labor costs (employment in finance 
dropped by 40% from 1997 to 2002) and corporate lending, which would help achieve 
the rapid reduction of chaebol indebtedness demanded by President Kim.  
The initial buyers were private equity firms. Their strategy was to buy troubled 
firms cheaply, then sell them quickly for substantial capital gain. The process started with 
the sale of Korea First Bank to Newbridge Capital in 1999, followed quickly by Lone 
Star’s takeover of the Korea Exchange Bank. The Korean government gave Newbridge a 
sweetheart deal. After spending 12.6 trillion won to clean up the bank’s bad debts, it sold 
the bank to Newbridge for one-half trillion won. But it also agreed to buy any assets that 
turned sour in the next three years, which cost the government an additional 5.1 trillion 
won – ten times the sale value! Newbridge sold Korea First to London-based Standard 
Chartered Bank for 3.4 trillion won in early 2005 – almost seven times its purchase price. 
Carlyle’s sale of the Korean-American bank generated a 250% return on investment, 
while Lone Star made 1.5 trillion won on the sale of Korea Exchange Bank. None of 
these banks paid any capital gains tax, which infuriated the public.  
Under these conditions, any foreign private equity firm that could hold on to its 
newly acquired Korean bank until financial markets were restored to some degree of 
health was bound to make a substantial profit at resale, whether it improved efficiency or 
not. Instead of investing large sums to modernize their banks, foreign owners extracted 
capital through dividends and a reduction in the bank’s capital base. BOK researchers 
concluded in a recent study that “foreign private-equity firms… focused on stabilizing the 
banks, rather than improving efficiency, with the goal of quickly selling their holdings” 
(Wall Street Journal, “Foreign Investors Induce Anxiety in South Korea,” May 11, 2005). 
 Foreign ownership of Korea’s large commercial banks has skyrocketed since the 
crisis, and giant multinational banks have begun to purchase banks initially taken by 
private equity funds. The foreign ownership share of the eight large urban banks grew 
from 12% in 1998 to 39% in late 2003 and 64% in late 2004. Foreign firms own more 
than half the shares of seven of the eight large commercial banks, totally dominating 
commercial banking in an economy in which corporate investment funding depends 
heavily on commercial bank loans. By mid-2005, the share of foreign ownership in major 
Korean banks included: Korea Exchange Bank 74%, Korea-America 100% (owned by 
Citibank); Korea First 100% (owned by Standard Chartered), Hana 76%, Kookmin, 84%; 
and Shinhan 63%. Publicly owned Woori Bank is the only major bank not owned 
primarily by foreigners, and it is soon to be privatized. Foreign owned banks are thus in 
position to strongly influence the pace of capital accumulation. A World Bank study 
(based on the share of  assets held by banks in which foreigners owned more than half the 
stock) showed that as early as 2001 Korea had much higher foreign bank ownership than 
most Asian countries: while Korea’s share was then 30%, Malaysia had19%, Thailand 
7%, Japan 7% and China 2% (World Bank 2003).  By mid-2005, Korea had higher 
foreign bank ownership than almost all Latin American countries.10  
                                                 
10 Combining Financial Supervisory Service data on bank assets as of late 2004 with foreign ownership 
data from mid 2005, the foreign share of all bank assets, including public banks, is about 60%. However, 
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The most important question is: what are the likely long-term effects of letting 
large foreign banks gain substantial control over Korea’s banking system? To answer, we 
need to consider the strategies that guide giant financial firms such as Citigroup and 
Standard Chartered.  These banks are likely to concentrate on three major market 
segments. First, they will service Korea’s and Asia’s growing wealthy elites – a strategy 
Gary Dymski calls “upscale retail” banking. Second, they will operate in the residential 
mortgage and household loan markets. The Economist recently noted that across Asia: 
“There has been a sea change in the attitude of banks [after the Asian crisis] which 
moved away from their beloved corporations toward consumers (“Asia’s banks have 
been shored up after the crisis – but business is still precarious,” May 2, 2005). Third, 
they will specialize in fee-generating services for large corporations, especially those that 
are foreign owned, and trading on their own account.  
By creating rising inequality, neoliberal restructuring is enlarging the “upscale 
retail” market that foreign banks see as their most important profit center. Korea already 
has $215 billion of wealthy household assets under private management, while all of Asia 
has $6.2 trillion.  
“Asia is the new battleground for the world’s private banks…Rapid 
economic expansion across the region is creating wealth at an astonishing pace. 
And more of that money is coming into the orbit of professional managers as 
Asia’s rich diversify from property and gold into bonds, equities and hedge 
funds…. Rich Asians generally demand a global service because the region’s 
financial crisis in 1997-98 taught them to spread their risks.” (The Economist, 
“Private Banking in Asia: Striking it Rich,” June 12, 2004.)  
Banks like Citi, which has 200 million customers in 100 countries, can offer every 
financial asset and service imaginable anywhere in the world – including investment 
options in off-shore tax havens, access to private equity funds and exclusive hedge funds 
--  and have vast experience catering to the rich in the advanced countries. It is hard to 
imagine domestically owned banks offering Citi serious competition. “Citibank seems 
particularly intent on going after the wealthy individual segment… With its array of 
services and strong reputation, the US company could provide unmatched one-stop 
shopping services. They have expertise in private banking service and can use their 
global franchise… to provide more products and services to clients” (Korea Herald, “US 
financial giant Citigroup seen targeting wealth consumer segment,” Feb 23, 2004.) Still, 
having suffered large losses in credit card lending, local firms will have to try to compete 
for elite money: “Handicapped by millions of unprofitable customers, credit card 
companies are chasing the moneyed elite, who are immune to the nation’s economic 
malaise” (Korea Herald “Credit card companies chase the rich,” August 11, 2004) 
Dominant foreign banks have huge investments in the software and hardware 
needed to efficiently assess the risk-return characteristics of mortgage and consumer 
credit applications as well as experience with securitization operations that provide the 
capital needed to operate in these markets. It will take time to create the credit 
information base required to maximize returns in this market, but eventually giant foreign 
banks will dominate, leaving only the bad risk applicants for domestic banks. “A bank 
with the systems and expertise of Citi will be able to pick and choose the best customers 
                                                                                                                                                 
the share for private commercial banks is about 80% in 2005, which is as high as in Mexico, and higher 
than in most other developing countries. 
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in Korea, leaving domestic banks with lower-grade ones.” (Financial Times “Asia’s 
banks have been shored up after the crisis – but business is still precarious” May 2, 2005, 
13.)  
Foreign banks and brokerage houses are also likely to dominate such fee 
generating income sources as derivatives trading and hedge fund operations. They are the 
firms that are helping turn Korea’s financial markets into casinos for the global rich, 
financial institutions, and large corporations operating in Korea. They are responsible for 
the explosion in international gambling on Korea’s stock market. In 2003, there were 
more futures and options contracts written on the KOSPI stock price index than on any 
other financial asset in the world (Dodd 2004). How can this possibly be “efficient”? 
Moreover, “the local currency market is turning into one of the most popular playgrounds 
for hedge funds, with the won becoming the main target by the international speculative 
funds aimed at short-term gains (Korea Times, “Won Under Attach from Hedge Funds, 
Feb 24, 2005). It would also be reasonable to assume that foreign banks, who have 
important long-term relations with many of the multinationals that have taken over large 
Korean firms, will favor these firms in any conflicts they may have with domestic 
competitors. 
Foreign banks are likely to help large domestic and foreign corporations in Korea 
fool regulators and tax collectors, and defraud investors, as they did for Enron, World 
Com and other large US corporations in the late 1990s. Citi was forced to pay $2 billion 
to Enron investors and $2.7 billion to WorldCom shareholders for helping these firms 
conduct colossal fraud. It was also punished for serious regulatory violations in Japan, 
China and Europe. According to Japanese regulators, Citi “failed to prevent transactions 
linked to money laundering, extended loans to manipulate publicly traded stocks, 
routinely misled customers about the risk involved in financial products and tied loans to 
the purchase of specific securities” (Wall Street Journal, “Japan Orders Citibank to Halt 
Private Banking,” September 20, 2004). Citi was fined by Britain’s financial regulatory 
agency for trying to game the European government bond market using a strategy its 
traders called “Dr. Evil.” It executed a $13.5 billion dollar sale on its own account in 
August 2, 2004 in just 18 seconds. This volume, equal to an average day’s trading, 
overwhelmed the electronic trading platform, causing a steep drop in prices. Less than an 
hour later, Cite purchased bonds at a large capital gain. (It also bought bond futures in 
anticipation of these trades). Korea’s Financial Supervisory Service announced it was 
going to investigate Citi “for possible links to money laundering and [illegal] domestic 
funds outflows through the US bank (Financial Times, “Seoul to investigate Citigroup 
operations,” October 5, 2004). The Korean government also initiated an investigation of 
foreign private equity funds for tax evasion, and is considering suspending derivatives 
trading by Deutsche Bank because it failed to inform several government-run companies 
of the risks involved in the derivatives it sold them (Financial Times, “S Korea set to 
suspend Deutsche,” June 25/26, 2005).   
Giant financial conglomerates have helped companies and wealthy families 
around the world evade financial and tax regulations for decades. As vividly described by 
James Henry in a recent book, leading international banks have created and fueled high-
growth global markets for: recycling foreign aid money stolen by third world politicians, 
illegal capital flight, money laundering, tax evasion, and illicit weapons traffic (Henry, 
2005).  William Grieder, one of America’s most astute economic observers, recently 
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commented that “Citi’s criminal behavior is so far flung and ambidextrous it seems to be 
[an integral] part of the profit structure” (Greider 2005.)  
 
The Effects of Foreign Financial Firms on Korea’s Economy 
 
One thing foreign banks will not do is fund long-term investment by Korea’s 
nonfinancial enterprises. Financial market funding for corporate investment in Korea is 
evaporating in the new foreign dominated regime. According to a 2003 BOK study, 
between 1998 and late 2003, foreign banks slashed corporate loans as a percent of total 
loans by 33 percentage points, while domestic banks, following their lead, cut such loans 
by 25 percentage points. Foreign banks also cut loans to small and medium enterprises 
more deeply than did domestic banks. The share of corporate lending in total bank 
lending decreased from about 75% in 1996 to 43.5 % in 2004. External funds provided 
by all financial institutions to the corporate sector decreased from about 118 trillion won 
in 1997 to an average of 65 trillion from 1999 to 2004 – a drop of 45%. Foreign banks 
also shifted bond holdings from corporate to government bonds, weakening a secure 
long-term source of finance for private investment. The share of government bonds in all 
securities held by foreign banks increased from 50% in 1998 to 68% in late 2003. The 
BOK report concludes that foreign banks have a powerful and growing influence in 
banking and that foreign control has reduced Korea’s growth potential by leading the 
shift away from corporate lending toward consumer loans and the purchase of 
government bonds (BOK 2003, p. 18)   
Whenever foreign firms take control of a developing country’s banking market, 
investment funding suffers, with small and medium businesses, which employ most 
workers, hit hardest. Consider the case of Mexico. Large foreign banks, including Citi, 
own 85% of local banking assets, the highest rate in Latin America. As was the case in 
Korea, foreign banks gained their stranglehold on Mexican banking by acquiring banks 
that were devastated by a crisis. They got them cheap, but only after bad assets had been 
cleaned up by the government at a cost of $105 billion – about 14% of GDP (“Mexico’s 
banking sector is bouncing back” Knowledge@Wharton, March 10, 2004). Foreign banks 
have starved Mexican companies of needed credit. “These banks are turning gigantic 
profits,” because “instead of providing credit to companies that could become engines for 
economic growth, banks have profited by charging expensive commissions for services 
such as credit card use and by filling loan portfolios with government bonds. The lack of 
available credit is a key obstacle to economic growth” (Wall Street Journal, “Mexico’s 
Foreign Banks Grow Uneasy,” March 17, 2004). Recently, credit card lending has 
increased, but, as in the case of Korea, the rise in consumer spending it generated is 
unsustainable: unless there is faster growth in jobs and real wages, debt burdens will 
constrain future consumption spending.  
Given that foreign banks are not likely to contribute to wide-spread prosperity in 
Korea over the long-run, it is important that domestic banks win the competition created 
by large-scale foreign entry because, if leaned on aggressively by the government, they 
might be induced to do so. However, domestic banks have yet to formulate a viable long-
term defensive strategy. According to Dymski, Korea’s banks “are simultaneously 
engaged in a strategic shift away from long-term lending relationships with large firms 
(especially chaebol), while moving toward alternative financial products and 
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relationships. The problem is that Korean banks…have just been burned in their efforts to 
move toward one alternative; that is, consumer lending. They do not yet have a well-
defined strategic option” (Dymski 2004, p. 22).  
Post-crisis data fail to provide evidence that foreign controlled financial 
institutions have been more efficient than domestic ones. Domestic banks had higher 
return on asset and return on equity performance in each year from 2001 to 2003. 
However, over the longer run, it seems likely that foreign banks will dominate the most 
profitable segments of Korea’s financial markets. Domestic firms may be left to compete 
with each other in marginally profitable segments. Dymski is pessimistic about the future 
of domestic banks: “If Citibank and other potential foreign competitors are permitted to 
enter the Korean market on their own terms and in pursuit of their own banking 
strategies, maintaining a competitive domestic banking system will be difficult or 
impossible” (2004, p. 24).  
Another problem is that the success of foreign banks is not closely tied to the 
general health of the Korean economy. Since their highest priority is catering to Korea’s 
wealthy elite, as long as income distribution remains highly unequal and the economy 
stumbles forward, however slowly, foreign banks will make money. Moreover, we 
should expect to see an increasing proportion of the financial assets of Korean elites 
moved offshore, which will further erode the link between foreign bank profits and 
Korean economic growth.  
Foreign banks are also more insulated from pressure to cooperate with 
government economic policies than are domestic institutions. Korea Exchange Bank and 
KorAm, both foreign owned, were the only creditor banks that refused the government’s 
request to participate in its $4.2 billion bailout of LC Card, the nation’s largest credit card 
issuer, when it faced bankruptcy in 2003. As one major newspaper put it: the arrival of  
“Citigroup may also signal a defining loss of influence by the government in banking 
decisions, with foreign institutions seen as less willing to succumb to government 
pressures” (Korea Herald, “US financial giant Citigroup seen targeting wealth consumer 
segment,” Feb 23, 2004) In 2001, Kim Jung Tae, president of the foreign-owned 
Kookmin bank, famously declared his unwillingness to be guided by government policy: 
“I want to make my way even if the government doesn’t like the idea” (Far Eastern 
Economic Review, “Punching above his weight,”August 23, 2001).  
As a result of these problems, the Korean people have become increasingly 
resistant to further encroachment by foreign economic interests, especially in financial 
markets. A recent article in the Financial Times noted the rising resentment against 
foreign investment: “Far from being welcomed for helping to rehabilitate its shattered 
economy, foreign investors are being demonized in the local press” (“If Korea is so cool, 
why is Seoul in a lather?, September 14, 2005). A public opinion poll done in May 2005 
showed that 94% of Koreans support the government's tax investigation of private equity 
funds, while 70% believe that foreign capital seeks short-term speculative profit rather 
than long-term growth. A majority believe the government should more tightly regulate 
foreign capital, should limit foreign entry in industries important to national security, and 
expel foreign firms that “distort the economic order” (Jose Ilbo, May. 17, 2005) “Foreign 
investors are becoming increasingly concerned that financial authorities, fuelled by 
popular outrage at the profits foreign funds are making, are trying to make life harder for 
foreign investors… The spotlight has been on foreign takeovers of banks in particular” 
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(Financial Times, “S Korea feels draught as doors open to foreigners,” April 11, 2005). 
The government has threatened to eliminate the ability of foreign private equity funds to 
evade Korean taxes, and to impose residency requirements on non-Korean directors. A 
bill requiring that half of all directors of Korean banks be Korean has been submitted to 
the legislature. The government also passed a law legalizing domestic private equity 
funds in Korea, and has pledged to invest $3 billion in public money to such funds. Its 
purpose is “to keep foreigners at bay, amid growing unease over the profit foreign private 
equity investors have been making” (Financial Times, “South Korea to foreign funds at 
bay” Feb 10, 2005, 19). Korea’s central bank recently issued a report (Jeon et al. 2004) 
“calling on regulators to encourage domestic investment in local banks and other Korean 
financial institutions, underscoring a growing wariness in the country about the role of 
foreign investors…The recommendations appear as the government prepares to divest its 
78% stake in Woori Finance Holdings,” one of the three largest banks in Korea. (Wall 
Street Journal, “Foreign Investors Induce Anxiety in South Korea,” May 11, 2005)   
There is nothing that prevents government restriction of foreign ownership of key 
banks. France and Germany made it quite clear that they will not tolerate foreign 
takeovers of ‘national champion’ companies. For example, the German government 
recently announced it will not allow Deutsche Bank to be sold to foreigners. The French 
government warned Pepsi in mid 2005 not to launch a hostile takeover bid for Danone, 
the publicly owned French food company. In September 2005 the Prime Minister “urged 
his compatriots to rally behind his concept of “economic patriotism”; meanwhile “the 
government is drawing up a list of 10 strategic industries to be shielded from foreign 
ownership” (Financial Times, “French PM firm on calls for ‘economic patriotism,’” 
September 23, 2005). China tightly controls its financial markets. Nevertheless, Korea’s 
current government remains determined to pursue its plan to make Korea the ‘Northeast 
Asian Financial Hub,’ which will require even greater efforts to woo foreign financial 
firms. Thus, at the moment, there is no effective road block to further foreign domination 
of Korea’s banking system even as the public backlash against it intensifies.  
 
IV. Conclusions  
 
After rising rapidly in the three and one-half decades leading up to the crisis, 
corporate investment has not grown at all in the post-crisis period. Real GDP growth 
substantially slowed, and may well decline further since the debt-fueled consumption 
bubble of 1999-2003 has run its course, and the rapid increase in net exports in 2003 and 
2004 cannot be sustained. A 2005 World Bank research paper on Korea concluded that 
“the national economy is now suffering from weak investment, slow growth and slow job 
creation and rising unemployment” and suggests that the neoliberal or “Anglo-Saxon” 
model may have been the wrong “blueprint” for post-crisis Korea (Lee et. al. 2005, p. 
38). 
Inequality and poverty have increased substantially, and labor’s condition is 
deteriorating. The radical deregulation of cross border capital flows brought very large 
costs and negligible benefits. The rising power of foreign financial firms contributed to 
investment stagnation, a dramatic increase in household indebtedness, and the conversion 
of Korea’s stock and foreign exchange markets into global gambling casinos. Giant 
global banks are poised to complete their conquest of Korea’s banking market, which 
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means continued problems for investment finance, an increasing disconnect between 
banking profits and economic prosperity, and tightening constraints on more effective or 
more progressive government policies. The US, the IMF, global corporations and Korea’s 
rich imposed radical neoliberalism on a Korean people who did not want it, not because 
of its development success record – it doesn’t have one, but because it was in their own 
self-interest to do so. The eight year experiment has worked well for them, but is a dismal 
failure for the majority of Korea’s people.  
A radical rethinking of economic institutions and policies is thus in order, based 
on a careful analysis of relevant history, not on neoliberal fairy tales. At a bare minimum, 
the government should reestablish effective regulation of domestic financial markets, re-
impose adequate control of short-term capital flows and FDI, and create a structure of 
incentives, penalties and controls that will shift financial flows away from speculation 
and excessive consumer credit, toward capital accumulation and productive pubic 
investment. Social welfare spending must be increased substantially and the tax system 
reformed to help reverse the rise in inequality, a goal that also requires a cease fire in the 
one-sided war waged by domestic and foreign capital and the government against the 
labor movement. Faster growth in employment and real wages is an essential component 
of healthy growth in domestic demand, and history suggests that this normally requires 
strong unions. What is needed now are the policies that should have been implemented in 
1998, designed to modernize the state-guided system that achieved the thirty five year 
Korean economic “miracle” and thoroughly democratize the economic planning process 
to eliminate its non-representative, anti-labor character.  
Unfortunately, these are not the lessons drawn by the current Roh government. 
Faced with stagnant domestic demand, the government has turned outward, banking on 
its ambitious plan to make Korea the ‘hub’ for economic activity in East Asia. “President 
Roh has made turning the country into the financial, manufacturing and logistics hub of 
the region a key component of his long-term economic plan” (Financial Times, “Aiming 
to create a regional hub,” December 1, 2004). There are a number of serious flaws in this 
plan, not least of which is the hubris involved in trying to make Korea the key economic 
force in an area with far stronger economic powers. The financial component of the plan 
could not possibly succeed without a qualitative increase in the power of foreign capital 
in Korea. To seriously enter the competition to become Asia’s dominant financial center 
would necessitate giving global financial institutions control of virtually all of Korea’s 
financial markets and the dismantling of most regulatory controls. The hub plan will not 
succeed; the growing political backlash against foreign financial institutions in Korea as 
well as competition from more developed Asian financial centers will prevent that. Our 
purpose in mentioning this plan is to demonstrate again the bankruptcy of economic 
policy making in post-crisis Korea, and to point out that the Korea government is not yet 
ready to learn the appropriate lessons from its failed experiment with neoliberalism.  
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